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The nature of agroparks: synergy versus risk 
a. Problem Statement 
The concept of agropark, an important element in metropolitan agriculture, emerged as a 
sustainable solution to many environmental and socio-economic problems confronting the agro-
food sector (De Wilt and Dobbelaar, 2005, Veldkamp, et al., 2008). The last decade has seen 
continuous efforts in developing various versions of agroparks, (Smeets, 2009). This promising 
concept has, however, had very few successes in terms of implementation. The main obstacles 
seem to be institutional factors such as social resistance and lack of participation of private firms 
(Laan, 2009). There is a strong need to investigate the economic underpinnings of agroparks. 
 
As a planning concept, an agropark is one integrated unit. Realization and functioning of this 
unit require therefore orchestrated efforts of different players at different segments and levels. 
Unless all activities are undertaken by a unitary actor, agropark requires cooperation and 
coordination among different actors. Economic agents have typically diverse interests, 
preferences and constraints, which may or may not align with the mission of an agropark. 
Sustainable cooperation in agroparks needs institutionalized collaboration among different 
economic agents.  
 
From an institutional perspective, economic agents cooperate under certain ‘rules of games’ that 
are defined by the institutional environment, which is embedded in social norms and values 
(Williamson, 2000). If the economic operations of an agropark concern multiple self-interested 
agents, a governance structure must exist which defines the ‘play of the game’. Governance 
structure refers to the institutional arrangements consisting of the rules by which an exchange is 
carried out and administered. It is the supporting structure for carrying out transactions 
(Hendrikse, 2003).  Based on various agropark designs, it is yet unclear which governance 
structure will be used for agroparks. In other words, a well-specified institutional design of 
agroparks is missing. 
 
Economic analysis of projects and operations requires correct identification of costs and benefits, 
which depend on institutional arrangements (Belli, et al., 2001). Lack of well-specified 
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institutional design makes it difficult, if not impossible, for stakeholders to assess their own 
benefits and risks associated with agroparks. Different governance structures can create different 
incentive structures and risk interdependencies for the stakeholders. Interdependencies among 
different economic agents, accompanied by many uncertainties, creates complexity for the 
economic analysis of agroparks. In particular, knowledge questions pertaining to risk analysis 
are: How do institutional factors influence the development of agroparks and how do they affect 
financial-economic risks.  
b. Objectives 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the analytical framework for the economic analysis of 
agroparks, of which risk analysis is an integral element, and describe the methodological 
approach to analyzing financial-economic risks of agroparks, which takes into account of various 
institutional factors.  
c. Procedures 
To establish a frame of reference for various institutional factors, we first perform a four-level 
analysis as presented in Slangen et al. (2008), i.e., 1) socially embeddedness (Level 1); 2) 
institutional environment (Level 2); 3) governance structure (Level 3); 4) incentive structure 
(Level 4). The analytical framework rests on the four-level analysis of agropark as an economic 
phenomenon to construct the typology of various agroparks and corresponding risks to key 
stakeholders. Following the analytical framework, Section 3 explains and illustrates the 
methodology with a case. A number of issues related to the analytical framework and the 
methodology are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
d. Results 
Based on the 4-level analysis, agropark concerns institutional factors on four-levels of social 
analysis, which adds to the institutional challenge of developing agroparks. As economic 
institution, agroparks have distinctive features compared to regular firms. The key features are 
presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Agropark as an economic phenomenon viewed from 4 levels of social analysis 
Level of analysis Regular Firms Agropark 
Level 1: Social embeddedness Mission: fitting Mission: leading/changing 
 
Level 2: Institutional 
environment: 
Ownership, property 
rights, formal 
institutions 
 
Well defined 
ownership and 
property rights; 
Existing rules and 
regulations; 
 
 
Joint/Incomplete/not well-
defined ownership; 
Lack of existing rules and 
regulations; 
 
Level 3: Governance structure 
and coordination 
mechanism: 
park management and 
internal coordination 
              
Market-based 
operation and 
cooperation 
Hierarchic structure,  
Vertical and horizontal 
integration through trust, 
agreements, contracts, 
authorities 
Level 4: Incentive structure and 
resource allocation 
Independent 
based on market 
prices and quantities 
Interdependent  
and coordinated, based both 
on market prices, quantities, 
and contracts 
 
To illustrate the synergies and risks of agroparks, a conceptual model is built which contains the 
essential relationships of an agropark. These relationships are graphically shown in Figure 1. 
Using Figure 1 as a frame of reference, features described in Table 1 are illustrated. Synergy and 
risks are described both in qualitative and quantitative terms. Synergetic effects include 
economies of scale, economies of scope, and value creation through internalization of (positive) 
externalities. Risks include system risks caused by positive correlations of negative effects and 
failure of cooperation due to various institutional factors. 
Based on the simplified agropark which captures the essential relationships, a fault-tree analysis 
is performed to identify determinants of the success of an agropark. Financial-economic risks 
associated with agroparks are quantified using Monte-Carlo Simulation, using farm data and 
macroeconomic data from the Netherlands. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual model of an agropark 
 
e. Conclusions 
As institutionalized collaboration, agropark has economic potential. However, institutional 
factors constitute major risks to the planning and realization of agroparks. Economic planning is 
not a game against nature but a game against rational economic agents. Behavior of different 
stakeholders must therefore be taken into account when planning and organizing an agropark.  
Quantitative risk analysis can help stakeholders in setting up the cooperation in an agropark. The 
methodology as described in this paper can be applied to agroparks in other countries. The 
results, however, are likely to be different as a result of different social-economic contexts. 
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